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Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

In the matter of:

Review of the Pioneer's
Preference Rules

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ET Docket No. 93-266

COMMENTS OF SATELLITE CD RADIO, INC.

SATELLITE CD RADIO, INC.

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Summary

Although the FCC tentatively concludes that its pioneer's preference policy should be scrapped, Satellite CD Radio, Inc. (CD Radio) strongly disagrees. Rather, the policy should be reformulated to grant preferences to innovators that also conceive of a new service, locate a spectral home for it, and persuade the Commission to make the allocation and adopt service rules. Unless the FCC provides incentives for companies that undertake such tasks, regulatory "free riders" will be able to follow their trail and leapfrog the pioneer in the capital markets. This would likely deter future applicants from the sort of proposals and efforts that, when they culminate in the offering of new communications services, inure to the benefit of the public.

Such a refocused preference policy would be consistent with the agency's original conception of pioneer's preferences. In the original *NPRM* and *Report and Order* adopting preferences, the FCC acknowledged that its own regulatory process acted as a barrier to the creation of new services using new spectrum. This is because a pioneer that conceives a new service and locates available spectrum must still persuade the Commission to allocate the spectrum and adopt rules for the new service. Because this process could take years, a pioneer's preference was designed in large part to reward *regulatory perseverance*, not simply technical innovation for which a patent could be obtained.

Contrary to the Commission's view, the recent auction legislation does not compel a different result. The final language, which is different from the House version quoted by the agency, actually appears to encourage continued grant of preferences.

Nor will auctions obviate the need for pioneer's preferences. Auctions are designed to speed up the licensing process, not the prior multiyear efforts required to conceive a new service, locate spectrum, then persuade the Commission to allocate that spectrum and adopt service rules. Even with auctions, the capital markets will still avoid pioneers that create services, but then have to wait out years of regulatory delay before licenses are issued. Indeed, because venture capitalists will be more likely to fund late-arriving entities that have not already sunk millions advocating the creation of the new service, absent pioneer preferences, auctions will actually encourage economic "free riding." This will tend to discourage companies from beginning the long process of new service creation and spectrum allocation, to the detriment of the public.

As a result, CD Radio suggests that the Commission reformulate pioneer's preferences to focus not merely on technical innovation (which can be protected by patent) but on regulatory efforts that result in the creation of a new communications service for the American people. This would most directly reward pioneers that pierce regulatory roadblocks in creating new services and new uses of the radio spectrum.

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COMMENTS OF SATELLITE CD RADIO, INC.

Satellite CD Radio, Inc. (CD Radio), by its attorneys, hereby comments on the Commission's *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)* in the above captioned docket.¹ CD Radio -- an applicant for a pioneer's preference in the satellite digital audio radio service (DARS) -- submits that completely abolishing the pioneer's preference policy would be contrary to the public interest. Nothing in the recent competitive bidding legislation compels such a result; indeed, the plain meaning of the Congressional language supports continuation of preference policies where needed to provide incentives not available under competitive bidding.

Rather than abrogating the policy altogether, CD Radio suggests reformulating pioneer's preferences to shift the focus away from rewarding merely technological innovators. Instead, the agency should ensure that useful licenses and/or compensation for regulatory costs may be awarded to applicants that propose new services, identify

¹ FCC 93-477 (Oct. 21, 1993).

appropriate spectrum, and then incur the time and expense to pursue the lengthy regulatory process necessary to obtain an allocation. In this way the Commission can create incentives, otherwise lacking, for companies to take on the expense and risk of bringing new services to the public with some assurance that investment will not be devalued by regulatory free riders.

I. INTRODUCTION

For over three and one-half years, CD Radio has been the principal -- often sole -- advocate of a new Satellite Radio service, which would deliver multichannel, yet "narrowcast," CD quality music and voice. This digital service would be available wherever users are: in their homes and offices, in cars, on portable radios, including in remote areas.

CD Radio was the first company in the United States with this vision; the first company to file a petition for rulemaking seeking spectrum for the service; and the first company to file an application for space stations.² CD Radio thus was the first entity to propose the new service of digital Satellite Radio, with the promise of enormous benefits to the listening public.

To make its new proposed service a reality, CD Radio also proposed innovative technology. While most previous conceptions of Satellite Radio envisioned the service as a "gap filler" in rural and remote areas, CD Radio was the first to design a seamless

² See Petition for Rulemaking and Applications of Satellite CD Radio, File No. 49/50-DSS-P/L-90 (filed May 18, 1990).

service that could operate in urban and suburban areas. CD Radio accomplished this by harnessing satellite spatial and frequency diversity. These technologies permit CD Radio substantially to overcome blockage, fading, and multipath that might normally interfere with satellite reception.

Accompanying this novel technology, CD Radio also was the private sector entity most directly responsible for locating and clearing available spectrum. When it became certain that the L-Band frequencies originally proposed for the service would not be available, CD Radio worked with the FCC, NTIA, the Department of Defense, and the relevant frequency coordinator to locate other appropriate spectrum in the S-band. More than one year before other interested entities sought DARS licenses, CD Radio was virtually the sole concerned private sector company dedicated to securing spectrum for the new service.

The above efforts were not free. From its inception, CD Radio has been raising and spending capital to try to make DARS a reality. Indeed, CD Radio has already spent millions on its technical and regulatory efforts. CD Radio made much of this investment *before* the December 13, 1992, "cut-off" that prompted the filing of competing applications. Since then, however, CD Radio funded an experimental DARS system that conclusively demonstrates the viability of an S-Band satellite DARS Service.³ In a very real sense, therefore, CD Radio launched the DARS concept,

³ Supplement to Pioneer's Preference Request ("Supplement to Pioneer's Preference Request"), GEN Docket No. 90-357, PP-24 (filed June 2, 1993).

created the service, then primed and cranked the regulatory pump. Meanwhile, other entities have requested licenses for themselves by standing on CD Radio's shoulders.

CD Radio's efforts fell squarely within the Commission's original criteria for "pioneers". For that reason, CD Radio applied for a pioneer's preference when it first tendered its application.⁴ More recently, CD Radio supplemented its request for a preference with new information regarding its recent experimental system operating in the S-Band.⁵ The request is still pending.

The Commission's *NPRM* suggests a comprehensive reexamination of the preference policy. The agency's action was prompted by recent legislation authorizing competitive bidding -- auctions -- which will apply to services that have pending mutually exclusive applications.⁶ The *NPRM* suggests that the fact that licenses could now be awarded to the highest bidder means that the financial markets can assess and reward pioneers by funding them, and their technology, in the auction process.⁷ The Commission thus tentatively concludes that auctions obviate the need for the preference policy. CD Radio submits that this is not, in fact, always the case.

⁴ Application of CD Radio, Inc., File Nos. 49/50-DSS-P/L-90 filed May 18, 1990); Supplement to Preference Request (filed Jan. 23, 1992).

⁵ See *supra* note 3.

⁶ Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, Title VI, § 6002, 107 Stat. 387-9 (enacted Aug. 10, 1993) ("Budget Act").

⁷ *NPRM*, ¶ 7.

II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD CONTINUE TO AWARD PIONEER'S PREFERENCES TO REGULATORY TRAILBLAZERS SO AS TO AVOID UNJUST DEVALUATION OF THEIR INVESTMENT BY FREE RIDERS

A. The Commission's Original Conception of Pioneers Support Granting Preferences to Applicants that Propose New Services and Obtain New Allocations

In its original *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking* on pioneer's preferences, the Commission determined to recognize the type of accomplishments CD Radio has achieved. In particular, the Commission was concerned that entities with important ideas for new services or technologies would be unable to bring those ideas to the marketplace because of regulatory roadblocks:

[W]hen an innovator, especially a small entity, develops an idea for a new service, it cannot simply arrange for developmental funding and try its idea in the market. Rather it must first request that the Commission allocate spectrum or change some technical standards, thus making the idea public, and then compete with other parties for a license. . . .[D]uring the proceeding to allocate spectrum or change technical standards, others--perhaps larger companies with greater resources--can evaluate the proposed new service and, if the rule making is successful, compete for a license at the same time as the original petitioner. . . . [T]he governmental process thus undermines the competitive edge that would normally accrue to the innovator.⁸

In effect, the original pioneer's preference *NPRM* reflected a concern that the agency's process constituted a substantial barrier to market entry and that the then-current

⁸ Establishment of Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants Proposing an Allocation for New Services, 5 F.C.C. Rcd 2766, 2766 (1990) (*Pioneer's Preference Notice*).

licensing policies did not efficiently allocate among competing applicants the cost of removing the barrier. The Commission realized that innovators -- especially smaller companies -- that developed new concepts were "worn down" by the multi-year regulatory effort required to obtain a license. As a result, the FCC concluded that market entry was deterred and potential new services shackled.

The *NPRM* also acknowledged that intellectual property laws, particularly the patent system, provided a mechanism for innovators to reap financial rewards. At the same time, the Commission admitted that the process worked imperfectly because "no system exists for rewarding those who develop new frequency-based services."⁹ While "[i]nnovators of new services must spend a considerable amount of time and money in order to develop these services,"¹⁰ there is no assurance that thereafter any particular company will be awarded a license or the financing necessary to construct. The preference policy, therefore, was proposed not primarily to compensate technological innovation, but to repay the costs of regulatory trailblazing.

The public generally supported the Commission's proposal, and the Commission adopted rules granting a pioneer's preference in 1991.¹¹ In so doing, the agency required a pioneer to be a *technical* innovator, but acknowledged that a pioneer had to do more than merely conceive a new invention:

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants Proposing an Allocation for New Services*, 6 F.C.C. Rcd 3488 (1991) (*Pioneer's Preference Order*).

[W]e will not consider a request for a pioneer's preference simply for the introduction of a new technology. . . . Unless a new technology is associated with a licensable service, there is little opportunity for the Commission to create a system of rewards to encourage its implementation.¹²

As a result, the Commission concluded that the new preference would "provide innovators and financial institutions with sufficient certainty"¹³ and "ensure that innovators have an opportunity to participate. . . in new services that they take a lead in developing."¹⁴

It is thus apparent that one fundamental purpose of the pioneer's preference policy was not simply to reward entities that developed new technologies. Rather, the policy was designed to ensure that companies that incur the cost of creating new services -- by a combination of technical innovation and regulatory effort -- can obtain the financial remuneration to stay in the marketplace long enough to offer commercial services and seek to make profits. Like the intellectual property system, pioneer's preferences are designed to encourage future conduct -- conceiving needed new services and locating available spectrum -- that meets the admonition of Section 157 of the Communications Act¹⁵ and inures to the benefit of the public at large.

¹² *Id.* at 3492 (footnote omitted).

¹³ *Id.* at 3494.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 3488.

¹⁵ "It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public." 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).

B. Recent Changes in the Licensing Process Support
Retaining Preferences for Regulatory Pioneers

Contrary to the Commission's tentative view, the competitive bidding legislation, and its legislative history, actually support retention of pioneer's preferences. Although the FCC is correct that the legislation emanating from the House of Representatives was strictly neutral on pioneer's preferences,¹⁶ the Senate version specifically permitted the agency to continue awarding preferences.¹⁷ The final language reflects this latter view:

Nothing in this subsection, or in the use of competitive bidding, shall . . . be construed to prevent the Commission from awarding licenses to those persons who make significant contributions to the development of a new telecommunications service or technology.¹⁸

The Conference report makes plain that it was the Senate's version that controlled:

"The Conference Agreement adopts the House provisions with an amendment [containing] three provisions from the Senate Amendment, including the provision of section 309(j)(5)(E) [now section 309(j)(6)(E)] concerning the so-called 'Pioneer's

¹⁶ H.R. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 257, *reprinted in* 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 584 ("The Commission has adopted and implemented this policy *sua sponte*. . . . The Commission should not, however, view the Committee's neutrality as any type of blessing or approval of its policies."). The Commission quotes this language in the *NPRM* without acknowledging subsequent changes. *See NPRM*, ¶ 9.

¹⁷ H.R. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 485, *reprinted in* 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1174 ("Conference Report").

¹⁸ Budget Act § 6002(a), 107 STAT at 389-90 (*to be codified at* 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)).

Preference.'"¹⁹ The law actually enacted, therefore, was not the House language the Commission quotes as a justification for its proposal.²⁰

The plain meaning of the new legislation is, as a minimum, that Congress did not believe that the new auction legislation was inconsistent with the grant of preferences.²¹ More likely, however, the language actually hints at Congressional approval of the agency's preference policies. Reading this language to suggest, even to authorize, *deletion* of preferences twists Congress's words beyond recognition.

CD Radio submits that the Commission must stick with the clear meaning of the new legislation. Nothing in the recent law compels reexamination of the preference policy, much less its complete abrogation. To remove its existing rule on preferences, therefore, the FCC must affirmatively find that the public interest would not be served by rewarding pioneers.²²

¹⁹ Conference Report at 485, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1174.

²⁰ Commissioner Barrett noted the Commission's misreading of the Congressional language. See Statement of Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett Dissenting in Part/Concurring in Part at 2 (appended to NPRM).

²¹ CD Radio does concur with the Commission that applicants receiving preferences are not mutually exclusive and therefore are exempt from any bidding or payment required of other applicants for the same service. See NPRM, ¶¶ 10, 12. The contrary view of Southwestern Bell strains credulity and appears to be prompted by mere competitive concerns specific to that company's situation.

²² See *Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company*, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) ("[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.").

**C. Auctions and Pioneer's Preferences Address
Different Concerns and Are Not Duplicative**

Regardless of how licenses are issued, the incentive system of pioneer's preferences should be maintained. At present, one entity can conceive of a new service and technology, and undertake the enormous effort necessary to identify and then support reallocation of necessary spectrum. Then, and quite properly, the Commission invites other interested parties to apply for licenses. After the qualified entities are licensed, all seek funding from the capital markets. One entity -- the pioneer -- is already saddled with millions of dollars of existing debt and equity incurred in the service development and spectrum allocation process. The remaining licensees have a significantly reduced cost structure, making new investment (needed to bring the service to life) much cheaper. Put differently, when Wall Street has the choice between a company that has already spent \$5 million and one that it can acquire for a few hundred thousand dollars, it is the latter that will be funded.

Pioneer's preferences and auctions therefore should be seen as solutions to fundamentally different problems. Preferences encourage improvements in the FCC's allocation of the radio spectrum. To do this, advantages are awarded to the innovators who successfully persuade the Commission to adopt a new allocation and create a new service. The primary benefit of auctions, on the other hand, comes from making the

initial license assignments more efficiently.²³ Auctions provide no particular incentive to innovators to undertake the expense and time to identify where technological change and public need warrant changes to the FCC's allocation scheme.

Companies that conceive of new services and formulate innovative technologies, and thereafter locate available spectrum and take the lead in the multiyear regulatory process of petitions, comments, notices and -- ultimately -- allocation and licensing, will simply not be aided by auctions. The bulk of their effort -- locating spectrum, then persuading the agency to allocate it, establishing an application cut off, and formulating service rules -- occurs well before licenses are assigned. Although auctions may streamline *licensing*, it will not speed up the lengthy process of spectrum identification, allocation and partition, all of which must occur before the first bid is tendered. By that time, the pioneer that funded the service may be long gone.

For this reason, the analysis in the *NPRM* is flatly wrong. Without a pioneer's preference, the followers, not the leaders, will be more likely to be rewarded in the capital markets. These followers become economic free riders off the labors of the pioneer; indeed, innovators may have an incentive to hang back and let a pioneer do all the "heavy lifting." A pioneer such as CD Radio may be left behind, along with any

²³ Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, FCC 93-455, ¶ 117 (Oct. 12, 1993); Kwerel & Felker, Using Auctions to Select FCC Licenses, OPP Working Paper No. 16 (May 1985); Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959).

incentives for future developers of new communications services.²⁴ And, although the patent system will reward advances solely in technology, when all licensed entities will offer similar services, the free riders will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the spectrum/service pioneer.

Indeed, if there is any connection between auctions and preferences, auctions may amplify the perverse incentive that disfavors pioneers. A system of auctions implies that financing must precede licensing, in order to outbid other applicants. But, Wall Street will continue to underwrite applicants with fewer sunk costs, bypassing the pioneer. Without a preference, a pioneer's efforts will be ignored by capital markets as funding flows to free riders that have ducked the early efforts. Absent recognition for pioneers, therefore, competitive bidding may actually constrain the development of new services in new spectrum, to the detriment of the public.

Once an allocation is made and auctions are set, the capital markets may recognize and invest in those applicants, big or small, with the best ideas, but the real public interest and financing problems lie in getting there. Venture capital firms are notoriously leery about investing in new ideas that require regulatory change to "get to the marketplace." From their vantage point, one or two years of probable regulatory delay turn a promising idea into an unsuitable risk. Pioneer preferences, as opposed to auctions, address this concern by strengthening the incentive that private parties have to

²⁴ CD Radio does not oppose FCC licensing of entities that follow a trail blazed by a spectrum pioneer: "The Commission can -- and should -- license free riders, but it should not anoint them as pioneers." Supplement to Pioneer's Preference Request at 4.

run this gauntlet and bring their new service to the American people. Nothing in the *NPRM* explains why deleting this narrow and carefully tailored incentive system will serve the public interest.

D. **The FCC Should Refocus Pioneer's
Preferences In Meaningful Ways Toward
Regulatory Pioneers Such as CD Radio**

Rather than abrogate the pioneer's preference policy, the FCC should refocus it.²⁵ Consistent with Section 157 of the Act, a preference should be rewarded for regulatory efforts and perseverance that results in the creation of a new communications service and allocation of spectrum therefor. While recipients of a preference must also conceive a technical innovation, they must also help create a new service and persuade the agency to adopt an allocation for it. Trailblazers such as CD Radio can, and should, have their early investment protected from late-arriving regulatory free riders.

CD Radio typifies one of the pioneers in need of special recognition. As the first to propose the new service, it literally pioneered the concept in the United States. Thereafter, CD Radio labored with the U.S. government to find a proper spectral home for the services. CD Radio also developed the pathbreaking technology, spatial and frequency diversity, that virtually eliminates fading and blocking in most environments. CD Radio is the regulatory pioneer that blazed the digital audio radio services trail

²⁵ Such a refocusing would satisfy any requirement that the Commission reexamine the public interest basis of its existing rules. See *NPRM*, ¶ 7 n.5.

before its three competitors were even incorporated yet, absent a preference, could be just one of four entities seeking funding for its license. To reward CD Radio and encourage future applicants, CD Radio and others like it should be designated a pioneer and either guaranteed a license and/or compensated for its start-up efforts.

III. CONCLUSION

Although the NPRM suggests that pioneer's preferences are no longer needed, the policy actually is fundamental to the continued encouragement of new technologies and new methods of using the radio spectrum. Deletion of the policy could actually impair technical progress and, worse still, discourage entities like CD Radio from beginning the multi-year process of spectrum reallocation and licensing. The preference policy should be retained, not because it inspires new technologies -- although it does -- but because it compensates for the delay and unfairness attendant to the regulatory process.


Absent pioneer's preferences, regulatory free riders will continue to be able to enter at the eleventh hour, file for and obtain licenses, and access the capital markets with a more favorable cost structure than the original proponent. Auctions, if anything, make it worse, because Wall Street would rather fund companies with fewer sunk costs. Moreover, and contrary to the Commission's reading, the recent legislation implementing auctions actually appears to approve, not condemn, the preference policies.

CD Radio is one such pioneer that the FCC should encourage. CD Radio's commitment to DARS is strong enough such that it will remain in the regulatory process even if no preference is available. However, other companies -- observing the lengthy and tortured experience of CD Radio, MTel, VITA and others -- may not be so confident of success. Simply put, pioneer's preferences serve the interest of the public at large by overcoming the inherent disincentives of the cumbersome and costly regulatory process for the creation of new services. Because the Commission should seek to encourage such entities now and in the future, the policy should be kept, but refocused on regulatory pioneering.

Respectfully submitted,

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